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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate a research methodology to prevent
chemical product failures. This methodology extends the risk in early design (RED)
method for prevention of failure in electromechanical products to include products with
chemical subsystems. Inclusion of this domain is demanded by the ever-growing
semiconductor and energy industries. The RED method was extended by first identifying
principal chemical failure modes and adding them to the failure mode taxonomy. The
RED database was then augmented with historical failures of products that included
chemical subsystems. Finally, the extension was validated with a case study of a fuel cell.
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1. INTRODUCTION

This research presents a methodology to analyze risk during the conceptual design
stage for products with substantial chemical components. This work is motivated by the
continuing growth of the semiconductor and energy industries.
Safety, performance, and reliability are principal concerns of any industry. These
concerns are particularly important to industries that rely on chemicals or chemical
processes because most chemical-human interaction is undesirable. Most process
chemicals have a negative impact on the human biochemical system, and many are
documented carcinogens or toxins; therefore, accidents involving these products are
particularly deadly. The Bhopal disaster is a dramatic example. This incident took place
at a Union Carbide pesticide plant in the Indian city of Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, on
December 3rd, 1984. The plant released an estimated 42 tons of toxic methyl isocyanate
(MIC) gas, exposing more than 500,000 people to MIC and other chemicals. The first
official death toll was 2,259. The government of Madhya Pradesh later confirmed that
total of 8,000 to 10,000 died within 72 hours, and 25,000 have since died from gasrelated diseases (Broughton, 2005). To address these concerns, the industry is currently
pushing to include safety and risk assessment in the early stages of conceptual design
(Uder, Stone and Tumer, 2004). Performance and safety problems can be eliminated with
a thorough understanding of potential failure modes and their causes. Such an
understanding can be gained from an understanding of prior product failures.
Past failures involving chemicals or chemical processes can be efficiently
cataloged using the RED method. Relevant information includes a description of the
failure, as well as its causes and effects. Such information is available from a variety of
sources such as academic journals (e.g. Physical Chemistry Chemical Physics journal,
American Physical Society, and Journal of Power Sources), The Mary K. O’Connor
Process Safety Center, and the Sandia National Laboratories web page.
To make use of the information available from historical failures during
conceptual product design, the RED method links failures need to product function
(Grantham Lough, Stone and Tumer, 2009).The use of function models improves the
ability to explore potential risk early in the conceptual design, independent of form and
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specific solutions. Once the information has been stored in the RED knowledge base, a
risk analysis can be performed quickly, and without great expense, even by inexperienced
designers.
A standard taxonomy is necessary to catalogue historical failures and to prevent
ambiguity in describing them. Such a taxonomy provides designers with a repeatable and
reusable vocabulary to work with (Tumer and Stone, 2003). The failure mode taxonomy
developed by Tumer and Stone does not presently account for chemical failure modes.
This research has developed a chemical failure mode addendum to the present failure
mode taxonomy. This modification will allow novice designers and engineers to quickly
generate chemical design risk by linking historical product failures to functionality.
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2. RELATED WORK

2.1. CURRENT PRACTICES FOR RISK INVOLVING CHEMICAL FAILURE
Current techniques to evaluate the potential for chemical failure include failure modes
and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA) and hazard and operability studies
(HAZOPS).
FMEA is a specific methodology to evaluate a system, design, process, or service
for possible failure mechanisms (Price, 1996). It is particularly suited for analyzing
potential reliability problems early in the development cycle where such issues are more
easily overcome. There are several types of FMEAs; some are used much more often
than others. System FMEA focuses on global system functions; design FMEA focuses on
components and subsystems, and process FMEA focuses on manufacturing and assembly
processes.
One benefit of FMEA is early identification and elimination of potential product
and process failure modes. This method prioritizes product and process deficiencies and
captures engineering and organization knowledge. FMEA emphasizes problem
prevention and documents risks and the actions taken to mitigate them (Price, 1996).
Unfortunately, FMEAs are cumbersome and time consuming. Bluvband and
Zilberberg (1998) have pointed out that FMEAs identify too many relationships between
failure modes, effects, causes, current controls, and recommended actions. According to
Montgomery et al. (1996), the several entries in the FMEA worksheet make FMEA
reports difficult to understand, produce, and maintain. In addition, FMEAs require
detailed knowledge of products and processes, and thus, the novice engineer cannot
easily use them. Another shortcoming of FMEAs is that they require engineers and
designers to estimates occurrence, severity, and detection based on experience.
Montgomery (1996) noted that the brainstorming process for FMEA is lengthy, time
consuming, and, prone error.
FTA is a logical, structured process that can identify potential causes of system
failure before the failures actually occur. Fault trees are powerful design tools that can
help ensure that product performance objectives are met. (Fault Tree Analysis, 2009)

4
FTA permits identification of possible system reliability or safety problems at
design time. FTA can assess system reliability or safety during operation and improve
understanding of a system. It identifies components that may require testing or more
rigorous scrutiny for quality assurance. They help identify root causes of equipment
failures (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981).
Although fault trees may reveal human error, they do little to determine the
underlying cause. FTA requires detailed knowledge of system design, construction and
operation. They are not suitable for assessing normal operations and may become very
large and complex (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981). Significant training and experience
are necessary to use this technique properly, and even once the technique has been
mastered, application remains time consuming. FTA is not practical for systems with
many safety-critical failures.
HAZOPS have been used over approximately four decades for identifying
potential hazards and operability problems caused by deviations from the design intent of
both new and existing process plants (Tyler, Crawley and Preston, 2008). The HAZOPS
procedure requires a full description of a process and systematic questioning of every part
of the system to determine how deviations from the design intent can arise. Once
deviations are identified, an assessment is made to determine whether the deviations and
their consequences can have a negative effect on the safe and efficient operation of the
plant. If necessary, action is then taken to remedy the situation. This is the method
followed by the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center (Mary Kay O'Connor
Process Safety Center, 2009).
The HAZOPS process is a systematic examination and therefore very thorough.
The team approach to HAZOPS makes the process multidisciplinary; allowing an indepth study of risk (Kletz, 2006) The HAZOPS team relies on operational experience and
historical performance. The process covers safety as well as operations and may indicate
solutions to the problems identified. HAZOPS consider operational procedures and
human errors.
A disadvantage of HAZOPS is their focus on single events rather than
combinations of possible events. Their reliance on guide words allows HAZOPS to
overlook some hazards not related to those words. From an engineering standpoint,
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HAZOPS are qualitative; they do not attempt to quantify either the occurrence or severity
of hazards (Neogy, et al., 1996). In addition, extensive training is essential for optimum
results, especially for the facilitator. HAZOPS are typically time consuming and thus
expensive.
All the methods currently available have three drawbacks: First they require
experienced designers or engineers. Second, they are time consuming. Third, their results
rely on the assumptions of designers and engineers regarding severity and occurrence.
The methodology presented here addresses these issues by allowing the novice engineers
and designers to quickly and repeatedly analyze risk for new product or process involving
chemical components by drawing from historical failure data and using consistent
terminology. This method is based on RED method developed by Grantham Lough
(Grantham Lough, Stone and Tumer, 2009).

2.2 THE RISK IN EARLY DESIGN (RED) METHOD
The RED method maps a product’s functions to potential failures and determines
the likelihood, and consequence of failure based on relevant cataloged historical failure
information. Table 2.1 shows the consequence and likelihood calculations used in RED.
Equation 1 yields the function-failure mode matrix using cataloged historical failure
modes:

EC x CF = EF (1)

Equation (1)

Where EC represents the function-component matrix, CF represents the componentfailure matrix and EF is the function-failure matrix.
Efforts to examine multiple electromechanical products led to the development of
some basic heuristics that assume a fully populated database of related historical failures.
The categories in the RED heuristics are described below (Grantham Lough, Stone and
Tumer, 2009)
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System Level: A stage of design that considers the product as a whole.
Subsystem Level: A stage of design that considers subsystems or smaller pieces
of the product.
Human centric product: Product requiring human input for its operation.
Unmanned product: Product requiring no direct human interaction during
operation.
The summary of the heuristics is presented in Table 2.2.
RED uses a matrix-based risk assessment to identify specific function-failure
mode combinations that have occurred historically and to quantify that information into
consequence and likelihood (Grantham Lough, Stone and Tumer, 2009). Since this
method employs documented historical function-failure combinations, novice designers
and engineers can implement it to ascertain potential risks. Also, the historical failures
catalogued in RED remove personal bias by providing a database with which to
determine consequence and likelihood values. (Grantham Lough, Stone and Tumer,
2009). RED can even be applied in the early conceptual phases of product design.
Avoiding risks at this early stage is less costly because the physical form has not yet been
determined
RED manipulates risks so that the risks are compatible with the risk fever chart
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 1999). The RED method is maps risks so that
both consequence and likelihood have integer values ranging from one to five. The risk
fever chart plots consequence values against the likelihood of values. It is easy to
decipher because risk elements are classified into three categories: high-risk, moderaterisk, and low-risk, each represented by a different color. The fever chart is populated with
risk data produced by the RED method and plotted according to values for consequence
and likelihood taken from the appropriate mapping matrices (Grantham Lough, Stone and
Tumer, 2009).
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Table 2.1. RED Likelihood and Consequence Mapping Summary (Grantham Lough,
Stone and Tumer, 2009)

Table 2.2. RED Heuristics (Grantham Lough, Stone and Tumer, 2009)

Grantham Lough, Stone, and Tumer (2009) illustrate RED risk assessment
performed on a functional model of a thermal control subsystem. Thousands of anomaly
reports for various missions and subsystems are contained in the problem/failure
reporting (P/FR) database at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Grantham Lough, Stone and
Tumer, 2009). A Thermal Control Subsystem is among these. From the functional model
of the subsystem, the functions were collected and used to select entries in the EC matrix.
Using this EC matrix thus formed, the product-specific function-failure (EFprod) matrix
was determined. EFprod lists only function-failure pairings that are relevant to the
particular product. Next, the risk likelihood and consequence calculations were
performed using the equations as shown in Table 2.1.using EC matrix and componentfailure severity (CF’) matrix. The L1 likelihood mapping is used as a risk assessment in
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the subsystem design level, whereas L2 mapping is used at the system design level. The
C1 consequence mapping is used in risk assessments that involve human related
products, whereas C2 mapping is better suited for unmanned products (Grantham Lough,
Stone and Tumer, 2009).The pros and cons for each of these mappings are shown in
Table 2.1. The risk fever chart from the four RED risk assessments performed on thermal
control subsystem risk assessments are shown in Table 2.3. All the risk assessments
produced 73 risk elements. Some sample risk elements from Thermal Control Subsystem
RED risk assessments are shown in Table 2.4. The risk elements contain specific
functions at risk for a specific failure mode, with a consequence and likelihood
combination.

Table 2.3. Thermal Control Subsystem RED Risk Assessments (Grantham Lough, Stone
and Tumer, 2009)
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Table 2.4. Sample Risk Elements from Thermal Control Subsystem RED Risk
Assessments (Grantham Lough, Stone and Tumer, 2009)

This work used the principle of the RED method to analyze chemical risk for
product with chemical subsystems. The following chapter describes the methodology.
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3. CHEMICAL RED METHOD

Chemical RED methodology relies on the concept of RED (Grantham Lough,
Stone and Tumer, 2009) to asses risks associated with chemical components or
subsystems. In addition, it uses function and the components of the functional basis, and
adds chemical failure modes to the failure mode taxonomy. The taxonomies permit
efficient communication of the potential risks in the early phases of product development.
These risks are then mapped to the risk fever chart, which shows the high-risk, moderaterisk and low-risk elements using numerical and colored codes. This chapter describes the
chemical failure modes developed for addition to the electrochemical failure mode
taxonomy and the steps of the methodology

3.1 FAILURE MODE
Failure mode is defined as the link between failure cause and failure effect,
(Collins, 1993). Failure modes are the physical, chemical, electrical, mechanical,
electromagnetic, structural, thermal, or atomic processes that lead to failure. Previous
work has produced an extensive list of electromechanical failure modes (Uder, Stone and
Tumer, 2004). Literature review and the definition of failure mode were combined to
ascertain the causes, failure modes, and effects that describe how chemical components
or subsystems fail at the elemental, physics-based level. Table 3.1 presents the resulting
chemical failure mode taxonomy as an addendum to the electromechanical taxonomy.

Table 3.1. Chemical Failure Modes
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The chemical taxonomy formulation process sought to identify failure modes that
can be described in terms of the elemental chemistry. New terms added to the taxonomy
had to be mutually exclusive to prevent overlapping among terms.
A review of the literature permitted identification of failure effects with chemical
significance. The failure cause was identified, and the link (the failure mode) derived
from this relationship. Table 3.2 is a schematic representation of this relationship.

Table 3.2. Schematic Representation of Failure Mode

Cause

Failure
mode

Effect

If a term overlapped to some degree with an existing term, then the following
categorization algorithm developed by Uder et al. (2004)was employed:
1) The new term might be a superset of the existing term it overlaps with, in
which case the new term might be used as a primary identifier.
2) The new term might be similar enough to an existing term that it might be
categorized as a comparable term (synonym) rather than entering it into the
basis as a new item.
3) The new term and the term which it overlaps may need to be combined or
replaced by a slightly broader term.
4) The new term and/or the term which it overlaps may need to be replaced by a
more specific term that provides mutual exclusivity.

12
Applying these algorithms, this work identified four chemical failure modes to be
added to the taxonomy. This section briefly defines the chemical failure modes
presenting the alphabetically by primary identifier in the same order in which they appear
in the chemical failure mode taxonomy addendum in Table 3.1. Although electrical
failure modes result in a short or open circuit, chemical failure modes lead to an
undesirable chemical reaction or process that manifests as degraded performance or a
total malfunction of device or subsystem. Some electrical failure modes, such as electron
migration, may also be classified as chemical failure modes because they lead to
undesirable chemical reactions that degrade performance.
Some possible failure modes identified by the literature review but eliminated by
the algorithm include interface failure and microdrop debonding. In the case of interface
failure, localized bonding of polymer-to-metal and polymer-to-glass have been
successfully achieved with transmission laser joining technique for the assembly and
packaging of polymer-based microsystems. Sultana (2007) performed failure mode
analysis of these bonds by optical microscopy, scanning electron microscopy and atomic
force microscopy. His work showed that interface failure is dominant in weak joints and
material failure is predominant in strong joints. Chemical analysis in the joint region,
performed by x-ray photoelectron spectroscopy, showed that interface failure as a
mechanism and diffusion as the failure mode in the perceived failure effect (a discolored
and weak joint). Although Polyvinylidene Fluoride. is a relatively stable polymer, it
forms comparatively good joint by chemical bonding with titanium and forms titanium
fluoride and titanium carbide type bonds as titanium diffuses across the bond. (Sultana,
2007). Therefore diffusion is the failure mode, and interface failure was not included as a
failure mode.
Microdrop debonding was noted on silicon carbide-coated carbon fibers in
aluminum matrix composites. One of the major problems associated with these systems is
the formation of aluminum carbide at the fiber/matrix interface, which promotes the
degradation of the fiber’s mechanical properties Both water and oxygen act as catalysts in
the reaction between aluminum and either carbon or silicon carbide to form aluminum
carbide in the fiber/matrix interphase region. The microdrop debonding is actually a

13
failure effect of the failure mode catalytic effect and therefore was not included in the
addendum to the failure mode taxonomy.
3.1.1. Failure Mode Identified as Catalytic Effect. Catalytic effect is the
increased or decreased in the rate of a chemical reaction by means of a chemical
substance known as a catalyst (Jencks, 1969). A catalyst is not consumed by the reaction
itself but may participate in multiple chemical transformations. Catalysts generally react
with one or more reactants to form intermediates that subsequently yield the final
reaction product. Catalytic effect may cause an unintended reaction, which results in the
reduced performance of a product. An example of this type of failure is in the oxidation
of silicone. Silicone device fabrication requires the oxidation of silicon. The presence of
cesium atoms promoted localized oxidation (Ernst and Yu, 1990). This localized
oxidation leads to failure of these devices
3.1.2. Failure Mode Identified as Charge Imbalance. Charge imbalance is a
loss of electrons (which creates a positive charge) or a gain of electrons (producing a
negative charge). Electrons are added and removed under the influence of elements
electro negativity. The imbalance charge creates a more reactive chemical species; which
when such species react successfully it can cause failure in some characteristic of the
product. For example, in the manufacture of organic light emitting diodes (OLEDs) there
is a growing consensus that one factor leading to the chemical failure is an imbalance of
charge carriers in one of the transport layers composing the device. Experiments carried
out by Knox et al.(2006).suggest that for Tris (8-hydroxyquinoline)aluminum(III)
(AlQ3)-based devices, degradation is related to an imbalance of charge on the AlQ3 side
of the heterojunction, resulting in the build-up of cationic AlQ3 species which may be
less stable and more reactive than the pristine material. Cationic AlQ3 may be more
susceptible to chemical reactions such as the hydrolysis failure. The luminosity of
affected OLED’s is compromised. Types of chemical chosen, operating temperature and
electromagnetic field have an effect on charge imbalance.
3.1.3. Failure Mode Identified as Diffusion. Diffusion refers to the process by
which molecules intermingle as a result of their kinetic energy of random motion
(Zumdahl, 2006). It is a net transport of molecules from a region of higher concentration
to one of lower concentration by random molecular motion. Fundamentally, two types of
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diffusion occur: Tracer diffusion a spontaneous mixing of molecules taking place in the
absence of concentration or chemical potential. Gradient and chemical diffusion occurs in
the presence of concentration or chemical potential gradient and it results in net transport
of mass, (Brogioli and Vailat, 2001). Diffusion may bring reactive species closer,
facilitating an unintended chemical reaction that leads to performance degradation in
device or subsystem. In the semiconductor industry, tin nitride has been popularly used as
a diffusion barrier between aluminum and silicone to prevent ‘‘spiking.’’ Spiking has,
been reported to occurs through tin nitride at temperatures higher than 500 °C. The
investigation of Al/TiN/Si showed that before spiking occurs, aluminum accumulates at
the bottom of tin nitride. Silicone also diffuses through tin nitride and dissolves into
aluminum. The aluminum accumulation at the bottom of tin nitride results in an
interfacial reaction between aluminum and tin nitride. This produces Al3Ti as a spike.
3.1.4 Failure Mode Identified as Free Radical Formation. Free radicals are
atoms, molecules, or ions with unpaired electrons on an otherwise open shell
configuration. These unpaired electrons are usually highly reactive, so radicals are likely
to take part in chemical reactions (Housecroft and Sharp, 1999). The formation of
radicals may involve the breaking of covalent bonds either homolytically, a process that
requires significant amounts of energy, or by single electron oxidation or reduction of an
atom or molecule. In a typical fuel cell, hydrogen is delivered to the anode side of the cell
that contains a catalyst, such as platinum. The platinum splits the hydrogen molecules
into hydrogen ions and electrons. With a proton exchange membrane in the middle, only
hydrogen ions can travel through the membrane to the cathode. Electrons travel on a
different path through the electrical circuit to the cathode, creating an electrical current.
Fuller’s research shows that the membrane, commonly made of a synthetic polymer, is
prone to attack by free radicals that create holes in the barrier. The free radicals are
formed by the decomposition of hydrogen peroxide, a strong oxidizing chemical that can
form near the membrane (Bi and Fuller, 2008)
3.1.5 Database Generation. The quality of the outputs of the methodology depends
largely on the quality of the historical failure data captured. A strong failure knowledgebase is essential for the generation of reliable estimates of chemical risks. The present
work investigated 22 failures of a chemical device or subsystem and catalogued the
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failure information. It included failure of microchips, diodes, fuel cells, polymer
membranes, nanofibers, adhesive bonds, implanted devices, microelectromechanical
machines, anodes, packing material, photo voltaic cells, and microbarriers. This small
database was used for the proof of concept of the method. The data thus extracted was
combined to build a failure knowledge-base by populating EC CF and CF’ matrices to
obtain the EF matrix, as described in Equation (1). This method uses RED equations
exactly. Table 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 show the matrices. The CF’ matrix uses the failure
severity values shown in Table 3.7 to map severity. The impact of the failure modes on
the devices is either explicitly stated in the text or can be inferred from the failure effects
noted in the case studies.

Table 3.3. EC Matrix

The rows of the EC matrix consists of functions from the functional basis (Hirtz et
al., 2002), and the column lists components from component taxonomy (Greer, et al.,
2003). The binary entries in this matrix indicate that the functionality has been solved (1)
or not (0) by the corresponding component. The numbers are either 0 or 1. 0 indicates
that the function (for instance guide solid) was not carried out by the component (diode,
micro chip, photovoltaic cell, etc) in the historical catalogued case studies. 1 indicates
that the function (for instance guide energy) was indeed carried out by the component in
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the catalogue of historical failures (diode, micro chip, photovoltaic cell, carbon fibers,
and micro barrier). This matrix is used to calculate the EF matrix, as shown in Equation
(1), the risk likelihood as shown in Equations (2) and (3), and risk consequence as shown
in Equations (4) and (5).

Table 3.4. CF Matrix

The CF matrix of the chemical RED method lists components in rows and failure
modes (from the taxonomy addendum. It is also used in Equations (2) and (3) to calculate
risk likelihood. The numerical matrix values indicate how many times the component has
exhibited a failure mode in the 22 cases investigated. For instance, microchips failed four
times by diffusion, two times by charge imbalance, one time by catalytic effect. They
never failed by free radical failure modes. This matrix is used to formulate the functionfailure mode EF matrix, as seen in Equation (1). The numerical entries correspond to how
many times the function has exhibited the corresponding failure mode in the cases that
were investigated. For instance, store liquid has exhibited the failure mode catalytic effect
once.
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Table 3.5. EF Matrix

The rows and columns of the CF’ is identical to the CF matrix, however, the numerical
entries represent the severity of the failure as displayed in the severity mapping in Table
3.7, and range from 0 to 5. For example, for the implanted device, the severity of the
failure was at 5 for both catalytic effect and charge imbalance. This level of severity
indicates that failure of the device may cause harm to humans.

Table 3.6. CF’ Matrix
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Table 3.7. Failure Severity Value Mapping (Wang and Roush, 2002)

In the case of AlQ3-based OLEDs, Knox et al. (2006) notes that diodes failed by
charge imbalance. This information is entered in the CF matrix. Knox et al observed
reduced intensity of the light emitting diodes, which would correspond to severity value
of 3 from Failure severity value mapping shown in Table 3.7. This value is entered into
the CF’ matrix. The diodes functional model is then derived (Stone, Tumer and Van Wie,
2004). The function failure matrix entry for the failure effect (charge imbalance) and the
corresponding functions (guide energy) is then provided a value indicating the number of
times guide energy has failed by charge imbalance.

3.2 APPLYING THE CHEMICAL RED METHOD
As in the RED method developed by Grantham Lough et al., in the chemical RED
method feeds the functional requirements into the failure knowledge base to generate a
list of potential risks. This list helps the novice designer forecast high-risk functions or
find ways to mitigate specific failures early in the design process. The steps involved in
are as follows.
Step 0: Database Population
An essential requirement of the method is to have a database of historical failure
data to include chemical failure modes. To generate such a database, a considerable
number of failures with chemical components or subsystems must be examined. Failure
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severity is assigned to the failure modes based on impact to system or device
performance on a 1 to 5 scale, with 5 bearing most severe impact with device posing
harm to humans.
The EC and CF matrices, their product (the EF matrix), and the CF’ matrix
created using the chemical failure cases as described in Section 3.1.5. These matrices
represent the repository based on chemical failure information and will be used to
analyze a fuel cell case study.
Step 1: Determine functions of product under investigation
To develop a function model of the new design or subsystem, a black box model
must first be created. The functional model is then derived from the black box model
according to the methodology of Stone et al. (2004). The functions are used to generate
the EF matrix as a part of the method, as described in Equation (1). The functionalities
are expressed in the form of function and flow by using the functional basis function
taxonomy. For the case study of the fuel cell, the black box model is shown in Table 3.8,
and in Table 3.9 as the functional model.

Table 3.8. Black Box Model of Fuel Cell

A fuel cell is an electrochemical conversion device. It produces electricity from fuel (on
the anode side) and an oxidant (on the cathode side), which react in the presence of an
electrolyte. This case study analyzes a proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cell that
failed (Stamenkovic and Markovic 2007). The Black Box model shows the overall
system requirement to generate electric energy. From the black box model, a functional
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model is derived following Functions Failure Design method (Stone, Tumer and Van
Wie, 2004).

Table 3.9. Functional Model of Fuel Cell

The functions derived are in the boxes, and are in a verb (for example export)
object (electrical energy) form. For the Fuel Cell case study, the functions are presented
as Table 3.10.

Table 3.10. Fuel Cell Functions
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Step 2: Risk Calculations
The next step is to map the consequence and likelihood mapping. Normally, the
formulations provided in Equations (2) through (5) are used to attach likelihood and
consequence data to the potential failures and thus arrive at identifiable risks.
For the fuel cell case study, only Equations (3) and (4) are used for this purpose.
Table 3.11 below shows, how Equations (3) and (4) are used in RED and why they are
used in the fuel cell case study. Given these three elements (EF, C1, and L2), combined
risk items are identified and quantified. The L2 equation is chosen as devices under study
will be considered systems. Since these devices require human inputs, the C1 equation is
used.

Table 3.11. Mapping Equations L2 and C1

The entries in the C1 matrix indicate the consequence of a particular functionfailure combination, and the entries in the L2 matrix indicate the likelihood that a
particular function will fail by a specific failure mode. By matching data from each of
these entries, risk statements can then be constructed. Table 3.12 shows the resulting risk
statement.
Guide gas fails by the failure mode diffusion with a consequence of 3 and a
likelihood of 1.
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Table 3.12. Risk Statement

Step 3: Risk Result Communication
The chemical RED method performs risk analysis that yields important
information for designers, such as the specific failure mode, likelihood, and consequence
for each function. These three elements must be properly communicated among design
team members. Visual representation is appealing to engineers, so they are plotted on a
risk fever chart (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 1999). The chart allows risk
statements to be condensed into low-risk; medium-risk; and high-risk elements by
plotting each of the risk statements according to the coordinates given by C and L
matrices. In this case the C1 and L2 matrices. The results indicate the overall risk. This
method was followed to produce the fever chart shown in Table 3.13.

Table 3.13. Risk Fever Chart for Fuel Cell
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The fuel cell studied here showed three moderate-risk items, and four low-risk
items. The moderate risk items were transfer energy fails due to diffusion, guide liquid
fails due to free radical, and guide gas fails due to free radical.
The purpose of this case study was to validate that the chemical Red method
identifies failure in an actual case. The fuel cell under study was a hydrogen fuel cell with
a Nafion polymer proton exchange membrane. Chemical changes in the Nafion
membranes were analyzed by X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS) and clear
evidence of polymer degradation was observed. Exposure of the membrane to two hours
of X-ray radiation did not affect the chemical structure of the membrane. However,
treatment with various Fenton's reagents indicated that the (CF2)n polymer backbone had
decomposed due to free radical formation. Fluorine and sulfur XPS peak intensity
decreases were consistent with the detection of fluoride and sulfate ions during test of the
fuel-cell. The increase in oxygen atom concentration suggests that oxygen-rich moieties
formed in the membrane after long-term operation. This case study demonstrated that the
fuel cell indeed failed due to free radical formation failure mode in the Nafion polymer
proton exchange membrane whose function is to guide liquid and gas in the fuel cell
(Stamenkovic and Markovic, 2007).
The chemical RED method indicates that free radical formation is a moderate
risk, and in the fuel cell case study showed that this was the primary failure mode. It also
indicated that diffusion due to transfer energy was a moderate risk. In the case study,
diffusion was identified for a secondary failure mode of a chemical attack of the CF2
backbone. Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) spectra showed the formation
of oxygen moieties in the degraded membrane. Two degradation schemes consistent with
the results observed have been proposed by Stamenkovic and Markovic (2007). Under
the same experimental conditions, no detectable changes in XPS spectra were found
between a fresh membrane electrode assembly (MEA) and an MEA after long-term
operation. These results suggest that degradation occurred mainly within the membrane
or at the membrane-electrode interface due to diffusion of oxygen-rich moieties.
Therefore as predicted the fuel cell membrane failed by diffusion, however, this was not
the main failure.
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The medium-risk items predicted by the chemical RED method were both evident
in the actual fuel cell case. The chemical RED method was therefore validated as a useful
risk analysis tool.
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The purpose of this paper was to demonstrate a method for assessing the risk
posed by chemical subsystems. During the early phase of product or process design, there
are many opportunities to avert risks by making changes to the functions, with minimal
impact on budget and schedule. The chemical RED method is effective when applied
early in the preliminary design phase, as demonstrated by the case study. Chemical RED
predicted that free radical formation and diffusion would present a moderate risk of
failure. Both were present in the fuel cell case studied, which identified free radical
formation as a primary failure mode. Four chemical failure modes were identified and
added to the electrochemical failure mode taxonomy. Potential areas of risk introduced
by chemical subsystems were determined using historical chemical failure data. The
current database was developed through the investigation of 22 chemical subsystem
failure case studies. This small database is used for proof of concept of the method. Many
more cases must be added to the database to ensure the effectiveness of this methods risk
assessment. This paper presents the procedure to apply the method to analyze chemical or
chemical subsystem risk. No prior knowledge of chemical failures is required to use this
method; one need only be familiar with the functions of the device or product under
study. This method, proved to be an efficient tool for novice engineers and designers to
determine chemical risks in the early design stages by identifying potential failures based
on catalogued historical data.
Future work on this topic will involve analysis and validation of the current
database and developing the database to include many more chemical failure case studies.
Such work will help form a more complete database and thus improve effectiveness of
this method in risk assessments. In addition, more chemical failure modes need to be
added as new material and processes come into existence.
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APPENDIX

POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES THAT WERE DISCARDED
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